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1. Introduction
Survey studies in various countries reveal striking di⁄erences between the attitudes
people have towards governmental redistribution of income. While some individuals
strongly demand redistributive policies, others oppose them as strongly. Interestingly,
those di⁄erent views characterize even individuals who share similar pre-￿scal income
levels and socio-demographic attributes. This ￿nding suggests that there is more to
attitudes to governmental redistribution than sel￿sh pecuniary concerns. To some
extent, demand for redistribution seems to be driven by individuals￿concerns for
fairness or distributive justice, i.e. the fact that people aspire to live in a just society,
a place where ￿one gets what one deserves, and deserves what one gets￿ .
If one accepts the idea that individuals have a concern for distributive justice, the
question remains about why such a concern produces heterogeneous views on redistri-
bution among individuals who extract similar monetary bene￿ts from it. Arguably,
distributive justice can be seen as a public good that individuals consume. Prefer-
ences for that public good might di⁄er: distributive justice might be very important
to some and not so important to others. Di⁄erent willingnesses to pay for distributive
justice might thus explain di⁄erent demands for redistribution.
A major di¢ culty with this approach is that it implicitly posits a one-to-one re-
lationship between attitudes toward governmental redistribution of income and con-
cerns for fairness, one which is not borne out by the data. E.g. there is no systematicWhat￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 3
evidence showing that people who are in support of laissez-faire care less about fair-
ness than people who support governmental redistribution.
A more subtle approach starts with the observation that what matters for in-
dividual judgement is the perceived amount of a public good. A given amount of
redistribution may be perceived as a public good by some and as a public bad by
others if those two groups maintain di⁄erent beliefs regarding the fairness of market
incomes in the ￿rst place. Individuals who believe that market income is determined
mainly by family background and luck may consume the public good "justice" only if
redistribution occurs. Conversely, individuals who believe that market incomes result
from e⁄ort and hard work may see governmental redistribution of income as produc-
ing a public bad. Hence, di⁄erent beliefs about the fairness of market outcomes may
induce di⁄erent amounts of subjectively consumed distributive justice, which may
explain di⁄erent demands for redistribution across otherwise identical individuals.
Consistent with this approach, survey data reveal large di⁄erences between the
views held by di⁄erent people concerning the causes of economic success or poverty.
And econometric work has shown that individual beliefs about how fair market out-
comes are contribute signi￿cantly to explaining individual demands for governmental
redistribution of income.
This paper adopts the view that people care about distributive justice and pro-
poses a method to estimate the monetary value of distributive justice as they perceiveWhat￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 4
it. How much income is society actually ready to give up in order to secure a fair
distribution of income? Does the average willingness to pay for distributive justice
amount to a few cents or many thousand dollars a year? In view of the considerable
resources that the polity devotes to the assessment of distributive justice and the
design of policies to attain it, these are very important questions.
In this paper, a theoretical model is developed that can be empirically imple-
mented to elicit the willingness to pay for distributive justice. The proposed method
exploits survey data but without running into the usual di¢ culties encountered by
survey methods for measuring the willingness to pay for public goods. Its applica-
bility is demonstrated by employing it to estimate the value of distributive justice in
the United States.
Our theoretical framework is a very stylized model of demand for governmental
redistribution of income in which demand is driven by both sel￿sh pecuniary motives
and a concern for justice. Individuals share the same idea of justice but di⁄er with
respect to their beliefs about how fair market outcomes are. Individuals who believe
market outcomes to be unfair require governmental redistribution to attain justice.
Individuals who view the market as a fair mechanism require laissez-faire in order
to perceive justice as realized. Thus, justice is de￿ned as a dichotomous variable.
For an individual who believes that the pre-￿scal distribution of income is unfair,
her willingness to pay for justice is de￿ned as the maximal amount of money thatWhat￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 5
she would be ready to sacri￿ce in order to prevent the actual income distribution
from switching to the distribution that would arise under laissez-faire. For somebody
who believes that the pre-￿scal distribution is fair, her willingness to pay for justice
is de￿ned as the maximal amount of money that she would be ready to sacri￿ce in
order to switch to laissez-faire.
In the basic model, individuals are posited to have di⁄erent beliefs but common
preferences. In the ￿nal part of the paper, we generalize that model to allow for
heterogenous preferences. The willingness to pay for justice can then be decomposed
into a part which is common to everybody and type-speci￿c parts.
In order to gauge the monetary value of justice, we embed the theoretical frame-
work into a random utility model. Estimating the random utility model requires only
measures of support for or opposition to redistribution, beliefs about the fairness of
market outcomes, and pre-￿scal incomes. A simple formula is derived which allows
one to recover the willingness to pay for distributive justice from the estimated coef-
￿cients of a probit regression and ￿scal data. Estimating type-speci￿c willingnesses
to pay requires one to employ appropriate interaction terms in the probit regression.
In the current paper, that formula is used to estimate the monetary value of justice
in the US. Our estimates, based on data from a large representative sample drawn
in 1998, suggest that Americans￿average willingness to pay for distributive justice
is substantial. We produce various estimates of the value of justice using di⁄erentWhat￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 6
measures. According to our estimations, the value of distributive justice in the US
roughly amounts to one ￿fth of its GDP. Expressed in per capita terms, the average
monetary value that American households put on distributive justice is estimated at
about $15,000 per year.
When we scrutinize the hypothesis of heterogeneous preferences for various types
of people (e.g., Republicans vs. Democrats, urban vs. rural dwellers), we ￿nd no
supportive evidence for it. This is consistent with the idea that political di⁄erences
between types are due to di⁄erences in the beliefs about the fairness of the market
system, rather than di⁄erences in the values they place on distributive justice.
This paper relates to two strands of literature. One consists of theoretical papers
that incorporate concerns of fairness into models of political redistribution of income.
A recent example is Alesina and Angeletos (2005), who aim at explaining the coexis-
tence of welfare and laissez-faire societies, each associated with di⁄erent perceptions
about the sources of economic disparities. In their model, fairness enters the voters￿
utility function and voters may face a tradeo⁄between own consumption and justice.
Piketty (1995) chooses a more extreme modeling option, according to which voters
only care about fairness, i.e. they vote so as to maximize a social welfare function.
Even if they share the same welfare function, individuals vote di⁄erently because they
have di⁄erent beliefs about the market return to e⁄ort.
The other strand of literature to which this paper is related is the one of econo-What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 7
metric investigations of survey data on attitudes toward governmental redistribution
of income. It includes papers by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Corneo and Gr￿ner
(2002) and Fong (2001). Those studies show that individuals￿beliefs about how fair
market outcomes are contribute signi￿cantly to explaining their demands for govern-
mental redistribution. The probit regressions presented in this paper belong to the
same family as those in that literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we describe our econo-
metric model. Data and measures are discussed in Sect. 3, while Sect. 4 presents
our estimation results. In Sect. 5 we show how the model can be generalized to
heterogeneous preferences and estimate the generalized model. Sect. 6 concludes.
2. Theoretical framework and empirical strategy
Individuals derive utility from the consumption of a numeraire good, C, and from the
feeling that the distribution of income among the members of society is just, J. All
other determinants of utility being held constant, perceiving the income distribution
to be unjust rather than just is assumed to decrease an individual￿ s utility. Utility is
assumed to be cardinally measurable and unit comparable and takes the form
U = ￿C +  J;What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 8
where ￿ and   are nonnegative scalars. The variable J 2 f￿1;1g takes the value
1 if the individual thinks that the allocation of resources in society is just and -1
otherwise. So, 2  represents the utility gain for the individual if she feels that justice
is realized. The individual￿ s monetary valuation of justice is therefore W = 2 =￿:
the individual is willing to sacri￿ce up to 2 =￿ units of her consumption to keep
justice preserved viz. to establish a just society.
Following the empirical studies discussed in the Introduction, we posit that the
existence or lack of distributive justice is related to two factors: the fairness of market
outcomes, f, and the governmental redistribution of incomes, R. Let f be 1 if market
incomes are perceived to be fair and 0 otherwise. Similarly, let R be 1 if the govern-
ment redistributes income and 0 otherwise. Justice is done if either market outcomes
are fair and government does not redistribute or market outcomes are unfair and
governmental redistribution occurs:
J = 1 , ff 6= Rg
J = ￿1 , ff = Rg:
Using these relationships, we can express utility as a function of f and R. Namely,What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 9
an agent￿ s utility may be written as
UR = ￿CR + ￿(1 ￿ 2f)
under R = 1 and as
UN = ￿CN + ￿(2f ￿ 1)
under R = 0. In this formulation, CR and CN respectively denote consumption with





as can easily be checked using the above de￿nition of justice. By way of an example,
suppose that market outcomes are unfair: f = 0. If there is no governmental redistri-
bution of income, R = 0; then, J = ￿1. Since U = UN if R = 0, we obtain  J = ￿￿.
Therefore,   = ￿ and W = 2￿=￿. The three remaining cases can be checked in a sim-
ilar fashion. Notice that W measures the willingness to pay for distributional justice,
not for governmental redistribution. The two notions only coincide if one thinks that
market outcomes are unfair. The theoretical model is closed by the assumption that
individuals support governmental redistribution of income if and only if they achieve
higher utility under redistribution.What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 10
In order to bring the theoretical framework to the data, we express it in terms of
a linear random utility model. Let utility in the case of redistribution be given by
UR = ￿CR + ￿(1 ￿ 2f) + x
0￿R + "R (2)
and utility in the case of absence of any redistribution be given by
UN = ￿CN + ￿(2f ￿ 1) + x
0￿N + "N: (3)
In the above equations, x is a vector of observable individual characteristics, the ￿rst
element of which is normalized to 1. "R and "N represent the error terms.
Preferences a⁄ect attitudes according to
Pr[d = 1jCN;CR;f;x] = Pr[UR > UN]; (4)
where d is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the agent supports governmental
redistribution of income and 0 otherwise.
Let y denote the individual￿ s market income. In the absence of redistribution,
market income and consumption coincide, i.e. CN = y. In the presence of redis-
tribution, we assume CR = y(1 ￿ t) + z, where t and z are the parameters of the
(a¢ ne) redistributive system. According to several empirical studies, e.g. Roemer etWhat￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 11
al. (2003), actual systems of redistribution are described rather well by a¢ neness.
Inserting the above de￿nitions of CN and CR in (2) and (3), and substituting the
resulting equations into (4), one obtains
Pr[d = 1jy;f;x] = Pr[￿(z ￿ ty) + ￿(2 ￿ 4f) + x
0￿ + " > 0jy;f;x]; (5)
where " = "R ￿ "N and ￿ = ￿R ￿ ￿N.1
This relationship can be estimated as a binary probit model. Let b bf = ￿bf and
b ay = ￿ay be the estimates of the coe¢ cients on f and y; respectively, where bf and ay
are probit estimates and ￿ is the (unknown) variance of the error term of the probit
equation.2
Note that
￿￿t = ￿ay (6)
and
￿4￿ = ￿bf: (7)





1If we assume that ￿R = ￿N = ￿ then x0￿ drops out of the model. Our empirical estimates do
not depend much on whether we impose this restriction.
2To obtain the probit model, one assumes that the distribution of the error is a standard normal
and thus ￿ = 1. Since in general the variance of the error term cannot be identi￿ed, only the ratio
of the coe¢ cient to ￿ is identi￿ed.What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 12
This formula is the basis for our quanti￿cation of the value of distributive justice. By
estimating equation (5), we will obtain numerical values for ay and bf. The value for
t will be taken from studies of national tax-transfer systems.
3. Data and measures
The assumptions of the model impose certain requirements on the data. First, the
model calls for a measure of pre-tax and pre-transfer income. Second, it calls for a
measure of absolute support for and opposition to redistribution rather than support
for more or less redistribution relative to the status quo. Third, it calls for a measure
that asks about a general redistributive policy that can achieve justice for society as a
whole. Widely available questions that ask about attitudes to ￿welfare￿or ￿helping
the poor￿may be inappropriate because they might be interpreted as asking about
small means-tested programs such as TANF or the former AFDC in the United States.
These programs may help the poor without having much ￿nancial impact on those
who never expect to qualify for bene￿ts, because the relatively small costs of the
program are shared by many taxpayers.
An additional concern is to avoid using ￿target-speci￿c￿beliefs about the fairness
of market incomes. When a redistributive policy targets a speci￿c group of people,
beliefs about the causes of income for that speci￿c group - referred to as target-speci￿c
beliefs - have much larger e⁄ects on support for that policy than beliefs about the
causes of income for people who are not in the target-group (Fong, 2005).What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 13
Finally, the publicly available social surveys tend to contain many ￿double-barreled￿
questions - namely, questions that ask about more than one concept at a time. While
it is di¢ cult to avoid double-barreled questions altogether, it is important to avoid
those that would introduce serious confounds into the analysis.3
3.1. Data. With these considerations in mind, the best data set for our purposes
turns out to be the Gallup Organization 1998 Social Audit titled ￿Haves and Have-
Nots￿(Gallup Organization, 1998). It is a national sample of the United States
containing 5001 respondents of the ages 18 years and older. The data set over-
samples the poor, so we use sample weights to make it nationally representative.
However, the sample weights have little e⁄ect on our estimates.
3.2. Measures. Tables A1 and A2 present summary statistics and the exact
wording of the attitudinal measures used in our analysis. Our dependent measure of
demand for governmental redistribution is a binary variable that asks whether or not
￿our government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich￿ . There are two
responses to this question - ￿should￿and ￿should not￿- plus ￿don￿ t know￿ . Out of
the whole nationally representative sample, 44.69 percent said the government should
redistribute, 51.52 percent said ￿should not￿ , and 3.79 percent said ￿don￿ t know￿or
3For example, there was a question that simultaneously asked about whether or not the dis-
tribution of income is fair and whether or not it should be more equal, thus relating to both our
dependent and independent measures. This question is clearly inappropriate.What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 14
did not respond.4 We code the responses so that support for redistribution is one and
opposition to redistribution is zero.5
While none of the potential dependent measures in the data sets we searched
were perfect, this question is one of the best because it asks about support for gen-
eral redistribution of wealth - suggesting a large program that is likely to have a
substantial ￿nancial impact on much of the population, rather than a small program
that concentrates its ￿nancial impact on the poor. However, the question also de-
scribes a program that targets the rich more than the poor, so we are careful to
avoid regressing our dependent measure on target-speci￿c beliefs about the causes of
wealth.
Beliefs about the fairness of market outcomes are recovered from two survey ques-
tions about the roles of e⁄ort and circumstances beyond individual control in causing,
respectively, poverty and wealth. These questions have nearly identical wording and
response scales. The one about causes of poverty is: ￿Just your opinion, which is more
often to blame if a person is poor ￿lack of e⁄ort on his or her part, or circumstances
beyond his or her control? 1) Lack of e⁄ort 2) Luck or circumstances beyond his/her
control, 3) Both, 4) Don￿ t know.￿We refer to this question as WHYPOOR. Out of
the whole nationally representative weighted sample, 42.80 percent said lack of e⁄ort
4Throughout this section we report nationally representative weighted proportions. The un-
weighted proportions are virtually the same as the weighted proportions.
5We code ￿don￿ t know￿as missing, because our model addresses the population of people who
know their preferences.What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 15
explained why people are poor, 40.59 percent said ￿luck or circumstances￿ , 13.95
percent said ￿both￿ , and 2.66 percent said they ￿don￿ t know￿or did not respond.
The question about causes of wealth is: ￿Just your opinion, which is more of-
ten to blame if a person is rich ￿ strong e⁄ort to succeed on his or her part, or luck
or circumstances beyond his or her control? 1) Strong e⁄ort 2) Luck or circum-
stances beyond his/her control 3) Both, 4) Don￿ t know.￿ We refer to this question
as WHYRICH. Out of the whole nationally representative weighted sample, 53.22
percent said strong e⁄ort explained why people are rich, 31.89 percent said ￿luck or
circumstances￿ , 11.34 percent said ￿both￿ , and 3.56 percent said they ￿don￿ t know￿
or did not respond.
Our theoretical model posits people with beliefs that are both ￿strong￿and ￿gen-
eral￿ . By strong beliefs, we mean certain beliefs that either e⁄ort matters (i.e. that
market outcomes are fair) or that luck matters (i.e. that market outcomes are unfair).
By general beliefs, we mean beliefs that the causes of income are the same for every-
one. Therefore, when estimating the value of justice, we merely use the sub-sample of
respondents who had strong and general beliefs - that is, those who either said that
lack of e⁄ort causes poverty and strong e⁄ort causes wealth or that bad luck causes
poverty and good luck causes wealth.
While this way of estimating the value of justice closely follows the theoretical
model, it leads us to neglect a considerable amount of information, as about half ofWhat￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 16
our sample does not consist of respondents with strong and general beliefs. Hence,
we also investigate a second regression equation, in which beliefs about the fairness
of market outcomes are constructed in a di⁄erent way. Our second measure of beliefs
comes from the survey question: ￿Do you think the economic system in the United
States is (read and rotate 1-2)? 1) Basically fair, since all Americans have an equal
opportunity to succeed OR 2) Basically unfair, since all Americans do not have an
equal opportunity to succeed 3) Don￿ t know.￿ We refer to this measure as ECONFAIR.
The speci￿c advantage of ECONFAIR as compared to the combination of WHY-
POOR and WHYRICH is that the former identi￿es the beliefs of the vast majority
of the survey participants. Out of the whole nationally representative sample, 68.00
percent of the respondents said the economic system is ￿basically fair￿ , 29.41 percent
said ￿basically unfair￿ , and only 2.59 percent said ￿don￿ t know￿or did not respond.
We code ￿basically unfair￿as zero and ￿basically fair￿as one. The disadvantage of
ECONFAIR is its greater ambiguity compared to WHYPOOR or WHYRICH. While
we would like to know whether or not respondents believe the market system to be
fair, ECONFAIR asks about the fairness of the economic system, a less precisely
de￿ned concept.
In all of our equations, we include annual pre-tax, pre-transfer household income.
Income was measured in nine categories. We specify it as a single measure by repre-
senting each category with an estimate of the median income of the people in thatWhat￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 17
category. We obtain the category medians for income levels up to $100,000 from
the concurrent March Supplement to the Current Population Survey.6 For income
levels greater than $100,000, we estimate the category medians using data on the
distribution of income up to $250,000 or more from the 2000 Current Population
Survey.7
The structural estimation of the theoretical model employs only market income
and beliefs about the fairness of market incomes as regressors. In order to check the
robustness of our results, we also run regressions with control variables. Including a
large number of controls has advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage is
that it helps address concerns about potential missing variables biases in the coe¢ -
cient on beliefs about fairness of market incomes. More speci￿cally, including a large
number of proxies for current and expected future ￿nancial security helps address
concerns that the means and variances of current and expected future income may
be correlated with beliefs that market incomes are fair and may bias the coe¢ cient
on beliefs upward if they are missing or poorly measured. The main disadvantage of
including a large number of proxies for ￿nancial security is that it introduces multi-
collinearity with current income and makes it di¢ cult to estimate the coe¢ cient on
6For each income category in the Gallup survey, there is a set of smaller income categories in the
CPS. For each Gallup income category, we use the CPS income category cuto⁄ point that is closest
to the 50th percentile.
7See Table HINC-07 of the Detailed Household Income Tables: 2000, from the 2001 Current
Population Survey March Supplement release.What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 18
income.
To assess this trade-o⁄, we examine the sensitivity of the coe¢ cients on the belief
about fairness and on income to speci￿cation changes. Along with a structural speci￿-
cation that includes only the beliefs measure and income, we present an intermediate
speci￿cation that controls for age, age squared, four age-group dummies, a dummy
for being white, a dummy for being male, the interaction between the dummies for
white and male, ￿ve education dummies, a dummy for being married, a dummy for
having one or more dependent children under the age of 18 in the household, and
dummies for living in a suburban area or a rural area (as opposed to an urban area);
and a full speci￿cation that includes additional objective and subjective indicators of
socioeconomic position and ￿nancial security. These additional controls are: seventy-
￿ve occupation dummies, a dummy for being a union member, dummies for being
employed part-time and being unemployed (as opposed to being employed full-time),
a dummy for owning a home, the value of the household￿ s non-home assets (ten dum-
mies), subjective worries about paying bills (three dummies), and three dummies for
having had too little money in the past year to pay for, respectively, medical bills,
food, and clothing. The Gallup data set does not include geographical variables (e.g.,
state of residence). However, the detailed information about occupation, employ-
ment status, population density of residence (i.e., rural, suburban or urban), union
membership, and so on, control for many of the economic di⁄erences between peopleWhat￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 19
living in di⁄erent states.
4. Baseline Results
Table 1 presents the probit results using the measure of beliefs about fairness con-
structed from WHYPOOR and WHYRICH. The table presents results from the
sub-sample of respondents who had strong and general beliefs about the causes of
poverty - namely, those who replied either that e⁄ort levels cause both poverty and
wealth or that luck or circumstances cause both poverty and wealth. Columns 1, 2
and 3 present, respectively, the structural, intermediate, and full speci￿cations.What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 20
Table 1. Probit regressions predicting support for redistribution with the belief
that e⁄ort levels cause wealth and poverty, rather than luck and circumstances
(WHYPOORRICH).
(1) (2) (3)
Fairness belief (WHYRICHPOOR) -0.820 -0.821 -0.799
(0.063)*** (0.066)*** (0.071)***












High school graduate -0.062 0.037
(0.115) (0.126)
Technical, trade, or business degree after high school 0.074 0.154
(0.167) (0.176)
Some college -0.275 -0.161
(0.118)** (0.131)
College degree -0.342 -0.209
(0.132)*** (0.147)
Some post-graduate education or more -0.276 -0.149
(0.131)** (0.154








Observations 2225 2190 2061
Wald ￿2 250.75 315.03 398.88
Numbers shown are coe¢ cients (robust standard errors in parentheses). * signi￿cant at 10%;
** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%. All equations include a constant. Equation in
column 2 also includes four age group dummies. Equation in column 3 also includes four age
group dummies, 75 occupation dummies, ten asset dummies, three dummies for not having
had enough money to buy food, clothes and medical care in the last year, three dummies
for subjective ￿nancial worries, and dummies for being unemployed, employed part-time, a
home owner, a union member.What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 21
Table 2. Probit regressions predicting support for redistribution with the belief
that the economic system is fair (ECONFAIR)
(1) (2) (3)
Fairness belief (ECONFAIR) -0.682 -0.610 -0.613
(0.047)*** (0.049)*** (0.052)***












High school graduate -0.157 -0.075
(0.079)** (0.084)
Technical, trade, or business degree after high school -0.087 0.032
(0.112) (0.118)
Some college -0.412 -0.301
(0.080)*** (0.089)***
College degree -0.334 -0.192
(0.091)*** (0.102)*
Some post-graduate education or more -0.295 -0.181
(0.090)*** (0.105)*








Observations 4362 4289 4035
Wald ￿2 339.78 419.39 528.12
Numbers shown are coe¢ cients (robust standard errors in parentheses). * signi￿cant at 10%;
** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%. All equations include a constant. Equation in
column 2 also includes four age group dummies. Equation in column 3 also includes four age
group dummies, 75 occupation dummies, ten asset dummies, three dummies for not having
had enough money to buy food, clothes and medical care in the last year, three dummies
for subjective ￿nancial worries, and dummies for being unemployed, employed part-time, a
home owner, a union member.What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 22
The e⁄ect of believing that e⁄ort causes wealth and poverty - compared to the
omitted category of believing that luck or circumstances cause wealth and poverty
- has a negative and highly signi￿cant e⁄ect on support for redistribution in every
speci￿cation. The table shows that the coe¢ cient on the belief measure is virtually
una⁄ected by speci￿cation changes. When we move from the structural speci￿cation
to the intermediate speci￿cation, the coe¢ cient on the belief about fairness stays vir-
tually the same, changing from -0.820 to -0.821. When moving from the intermediate
to the full speci￿cation the magnitude of the coe¢ cient on beliefs stays roughly the
same, decreasing by less than three percent (to -0.799).
Income also has a highly signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on support for redistribution
in every speci￿cation. However, the coe¢ cient on income is quite sensitive to speci￿-
cation changes. Moving from the structural to the intermediate speci￿cation reduces
the magnitude of the coe¢ cient on income by about 30 percent (from 6.58E-6 to
4.58E-6). Moving from the intermediate to the full speci￿cation reduces the mag-
nitude of the coe¢ cient on income by about 40 percent (to 2.75E-6). Thus, for the
purpose of estimating the coe¢ cient on income, the common practice of including as
many control variables as possible is clearly inappropriate.
Table 2 presents the probit results from equations using ECONFAIR to measure
beliefs about the fairness of market outcomes. The structural, intermediate, and full
speci￿cations are presented in columns 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
ECONFAIR has a highly signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on support for redistribution
in every speci￿cation. Its coe¢ cient is also quite stable across speci￿cations. Mov-
ing from the structural to the intermediate speci￿cation decreases the magnitude of
the coe¢ cient by eleven percent (from -0.682 to -0.610). When moving from the
intermediate to the full speci￿cation, however, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient stays
roughly the same (-0.613).
Income has a highly signi￿cant negative e⁄ect in all three speci￿cations. However,What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 23
as before, its e⁄ect is quite sensitive to speci￿cation. Moving from the structural
to the intermediate speci￿cation, reduces the magnitude of the coe¢ cient on income
by 24 percent (from 6.06E-6 to 4.58E-6). Moving from the intermediate to the full
speci￿cation reduces its magnitude by about 42 percent (to 2.67E-6).
4.1. Baseline estimates of the value of justice. The value of distributive
justice is given by Equation (8). In addition to our estimates of the coe¢ cient on
income and the belief that market outcomes are fair, we need an estimate of t, the
marginal tax rate of the linear redistributive system.
Our dependent variable asks whether the government should redistribute, without
specifying the extent of redistribution. Since redistribution does occur in the United
States, a natural interpretation of the survey question is whether the government
should keep redistributing at its actual level. Under this interpretation, the t of our
theoretical model corresponds to the actual marginal tax rate. Alternatively, the
extent of redistribution conjectured by respondents might have been larger than the
actual level. However, since we do not know what that conjecture could have possibly
been, we stick to the ￿rst interpretation and set t equal to the actual marginal tax rate
of the US redistributive system. We set t = 25:56%, the marginal tax rate estimated
by Saez (2004, Table A) for the US in 1998.8 One might view this as leading to the
estimation of a lower bound for the value of distributive justice in the US.
Range of estimates using WHYPOOR/WHYRICH measure. Table 1
gives us estimates of bf and ay for a household with strong general beliefs. Substi-
tuting the estimates of bf, ay from column 1 of Table 1 and the Saez (2004) estimate
of t into formula (8), one obtains an estimated value of distributive justice equal to
$15,955.98 for a household with strong general beliefs. This means the following: On
8Roemer et al. (2003) estimate the US marginal tax rate at 24.3%. However, their estimate
refers to 1991. Saez￿ s (2004) estimate for 1991 is 23.11%.What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 24
average, a US household with strong general beliefs about market fairness - which
characterizes about half of US households - is willing to pay almost $16,000 a year to
live in a just society.
Based on these estimates, the value of distributive justice for the United States eas-
ily obtains. In 1998 (the year the Gallup data were collected) there were 103,874,000
households in the United States (CPS march supplement). Assuming that every-
body has the same willingness to pay for justice as that of respondents with strong
and general beliefs, the value of justice for the United States is estimated to be
$1,654,007,856,247 in 1998. This represents 20.09 percent of the US GDP.
The above computations extrapolate from the results based on the sub-sample
containing respondents who had strong beliefs. According to our data, that sub-
sample represents 48.26 percent of the households in the United States. The remaining
51.74 percent of the sample had weak and/or speci￿c beliefs. Our theoretical model
does not make predictions for these individuals. A priori, there seems to be nothing
wrong in positing that these individuals have the same willingness to pay for justice
as those in the other group. Preferences for justice have no evident relationship to
beliefs about the fairness of market outcomes. These beliefs should be related to
(indirect) preferences for governmental redistribution, not to (direct) preferences for
justice.
Estimate using ECONFAIR measure. Table 2 displays estimates of bf and
ay produced by using ECONFAIR and the whole nationally representative sample.
Substituting the estimates of bf and ay from column 1 of Table 2, along with the Saez
(2004) estimate of t into Equation (8) one obtains an estimated value of justice of
$14,350.23 per household. Thus, the aggregate value of justice for the whole economy
is the equivalent of 18.11 percent of GDP. These numbers are reasonably close to
those obtained using the WHYPOOR/WHYRICH measure.What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 25
Clearly, our estimates indicate that the monetary value of distributive justice is
large. This is not the artifact of using the structural speci￿cation to recover the
coe¢ cients for computing W. Using the intermediate or the full speci￿cation (i.e.
columns 2 and 3 in Tables 1 and 2) would produce even larger estimates. This is
due to the fact that, according to (8), the value of distributive justice is proportional
to the ratio between the coe¢ cient of the beliefs variable and the coe¢ cient of the
income variable. Including control variables leaves the value of the coe¢ cient on the
beliefs variable almost unchanged while it decreases the value of the coe¢ cient on the
income variable, in absolute terms. Hence, the estimate of W increases when control
variables are included.
5. Estimating the value of justice for different types of
households
So far, we have based our estimates on the assumption that individuals have the same
utility function. However, one may wonder whether this assumption is appropriate
or whether di⁄erent types within the population value distributive justice di⁄erently.
To address this issue, we generalize the theoretical model of Sect. 2 in a straight-
forward way. We denote household types by k = 1;2;:::K. Variable Tk 2 f0;1g
takes value 1 if and only if the household has type k. Types are assumed to a⁄ect
preferences according to








where ￿ is a constant and ￿k captures the type-speci￿c preferences. The additional













is the total willingness to pay.
Following the same steps as in Sect. 2, we embed this theoretical framework in a
random utility model. Now, we have
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Hence, estimating the speci￿c willingness to pay of a household type merely re-
quires the use of appropriate interaction terms.
Bringing this theoretical framework to the data is not straightforward because
of the di¢ culty of ￿nding proper empirical correlates of household types. Ideally,
one would like to employ characteristics of households that are exogenous and un-
correlated with the key regressors ￿beliefs￿and ￿income￿ , so as to produce reliable
coe¢ cient estimates. In practice, these conditions may be hard to ful￿ll.
In Table 3, we present estimates that include interaction terms which capture the
following types: White, Republican, rural dweller, and male. Column 1 presents the
results using WHYRICH/WHYPOOR in the sub-sample of respondents with strong
and general beliefs. Column 2 presents the results using ECONFAIR in the whole
nationally representative sample.
As our ￿ndings show, there are no robust interaction e⁄ects. The interaction
between beliefs and being white is statistically signi￿cant in the ￿rst column but not
the second column. No other interaction terms are signi￿cant. This picture would not
change if one includes in the regressions the control variables employed in Columns
2 and 3 of Tables 1 and 2. These ￿ndings suggest that the willingness to pay for
justice is fairly constant across types of people. This supports the view that political
di⁄erences across types of people are due to di⁄erences in the beliefs they hold about
the fairness of market outcomes rather than the extent to which they care about
justice.
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Table 3. Probit regressions predicting support for redistribution with WHY-
POORRICH (column 1) and ECONFAIR (column 2). Equations include in-
teractions between fairness beliefs and types of households.
(1) (2)












Fairness belief*White -0.411 -0.146
(0.160)** (0.117)
Fairness belief *Male -0.045 -0.127
(0.129) (0.098)
Fairness belief *Republican -0.059 -0.173
(0.154) (0.118)
Fairness belief *Rural 0.147 -0.037
(0.152) (0.113)
Observations 2202 4315
Wald ￿2 340.90 499.83
Numbers shown are coe¢ cients (robust standard errors in parentheses). * signi￿cant at
10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%. Both equations also include a constant.
6. Conclusion
Most people agree that one should get what one deserves, and deserve what one gets.
Distributive justice can thus be seen as a pure public good that increases the utility of
all members of society. It is, however, a rather special good since people have di⁄erent
beliefs about the appropriate technology to produce it. To some, distributive justice is
the outcome of free markets, whereas to others governmental redistribution of income
is necessary to achieve it.
The current paper has developed a simple theoretical model that can be em-What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 29
pirically implemented to estimate the monetary value of distributive justice. Our
estimates indicate that, in 1998, the value of distributive justice in the United States
amounted to about one ￿fth of GDP. This is substantial.
We found no evidence that the monetary value of distributive justice varies across
types of people. This is consistent with the idea that political di⁄erences between
types are due to di⁄erences in the beliefs about the fairness of the market system,
rather than di⁄erences in the values they place on distributive justice.
Of course, our estimation results should be interpreted with some caution. The
theoretical model on which they are based is a very stylized one, which de￿nes distrib-
utive justice as a dichotomous variable. While this is a reasonable ￿rst approximation,
in reality, perceptions of distributive justice are more like a continuous variable. Ex-
tending the current model to account for a richer structure of preferences and a more
realistic system of redistribution would be worthwhile. With respect to the empirical
measures of attitudes and beliefs, those available were far from ideal. It would be nice
to have survey questions that are less vulnerable to multiple interpretations and allow
for a ￿ner grid of measurement. Attacking these issues is a task for future research.What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 30
References
Alesina, A. and G.-M. Angeletos, 2005, Fairness and redistribution, American Eco-
nomic Review 95, 960-980.
Alesina, A. and E. La Ferrara, 2005, Preferences for redistribution in the land of
opportunities, Journal of Public Economics 89, 897-931.
Corneo, G. and H.-P. Gr￿ner, 2002, Individual preferences for political redistribu-
tion, Journal of Public Economics 83, 83-107.
Fong, C., 2001, Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution,
Journal of Public Economics 82, 225-246.
Fong, C. 2005, Which beliefs matter for redistributive politics? Target-speci￿c versus
general beliefs about the causes of income, mimeo.
Gallup Organization, 1998, Haves and Have-Nots: Perceptions of Fairness and Op-
portunity, Gallup Organization.
Piketty, T., 1995, Social mobility and redistributive politics, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 110, 551-585.
Roemer, J. and fourteen coauthors, 2003, To what extent do ￿scal regimes equalize
opportunities for income acquisition among citizens? Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 87, 539-565.
Saez, E., 2004, Reported Incomes and Marginal Tax Rates, 1960-2000: Evidence
and Policy Implications, NBER wp 10273.What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 31
Data Appendix
Table A1. Exact wording of and responses to measures of dependent variable and
beliefs about fairness of market outcomes.
Dependent Variable: ￿People feel di⁄erently about how far a government
should go. Here is a phrase which some people believe in and some don￿ t. Do you




￿Don￿ t know ￿(2.93%)
Non-response (0.86%)
WHYPOOR: ￿Just your opinion, which is more often to blame if a person
is poor ￿lack of e⁄ort on his or her part, or circumstances beyond his or her
control?￿





WHYRICH: ￿Just your opinion, which is more often to blame if a person is
rich ￿ strong e⁄ort to succeed on his or her part, or luck or circumstances beyond
his or her control?￿





ECONFAIR: "Do you think the economic system in the United States is (read
and rotate 1-2)?￿
￿1) Basically fair, since all Americans have an equal opportunity to succeed OR￿
(68.00%)
￿2) Basically unfair, since all Americans do not have an equal opportunity to
succeed￿(29.41%)
￿3) Don￿ t know." (1.91%)
Non-response (0.68%)
Percentages shown are estimated nationally representative proportions using sample weights.
N = 5001 (including non-response).What￿ s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 32





Income (Constructed by representing each of nine income categories by
their estimated medians. Category medians are estimated with data
from the concurrent CPS March Supplement.)
4571 46772.19 553.258
Age 4925 44.85 0.282
Age squared 4925 2311.82 28.437
Dummy Variables
White 4899 0.809 0.006
Male 4998 0.476 0.008
Age group 2 (30-39 yrs.) 4925 0.222 0.006
Age group 3 (40-49 yrs.) 4925 0.204 0.006
Age group 4 (50-64 yrs.) 4925 0.189 0.006
Age group 5 (65-99 yrs.) 4925 0.165 0.006
High school graduate 4959 0.279 0.007
Technical, trade, or business degree after high school 4959 0.053 0.003
Some college 4959 0.269 0.007
College degree 4959 0.11 0.004
Some post-graduate education or more 4959 0.118 0.004
Child under 18 living at home 4967 0.388 0.007
Married 4961 0.541 0.008
Suburban 5001 0.477 0.008
Rural 5001 0.228 0.006
In last year, did not have enough money to buy clothing family needed 4988 0.174 0.006
In last year, did not have enough money to buy food family needed 4989 0.11 0.005
In last year, did not have enough money to pay for medical care 4980 0.218 0.006
Worries that income will not meet bills: most of the time 4971 0.444 0.008
Worries that income will not meet bills: some of the time 4971 0.119 0.005
Worries that income will not meet bills: almost never 4971 0.094 0.005
Union member 4966 0.108 0.005
Employed part-time 4961 0.129 0.005
Not employed 4961 0.307 0.007
Non-home assets >$0<$1000 4453 0.029 0.003
Non-home assets ￿$1000<$5000 4453 0.057 0.004
Non-home assets ￿$5000<$10,000 4453 0.067 0.004
Non-home assets ￿$10,000<$30,000 4453 0.162 0.006
Non-home assets ￿$30,000<$50,000 4453 0.109 0.005
Non-home assets ￿$50,000<$75,000 4453 0.068 0.004
Non-home assets ￿$75,000<$100,000 4453 0.047 0.003
Non-home assets ￿$100,000<$250,000 4453 0.079 0.004
Non-home assets ￿$250,000<$500,000 4453 0.032 0.003
Non-home assets >$500,000 4453 0.032 0.003
a The full speci￿cation includes 75 occupation dummies that are not summarized in this table.
b Means are estimated from the nationally representative weighted sample.CESifo Working Paper Series 
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